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Abstract 
In this paper I highlight the analogy between the epistemological and methodological 
aspects of the activity of intelligence agencies and some scientific disciplines, advocating for a 
more scientific approach to the process of collecting and analyzing information within the 
intelligence cycle. I assert that the theoretical, ontological and epistemological aspects of the 
activity of many intelligence agencies are underestimated, leading to incomplete understanding of 
current phenomena and confusion in inter-institutional collaboration. After a brief Introduction, 
which includes a history of the evolution of the intelligence concept after World War II, 
Intelligence Activity defines the objectives and organization of intelligence agencies, the core 
model of these organizations (the intelligence cycle), and the relevant aspects of the intelligence 
gathering and intelligence analysis. In the Ontology section, I highlight the ontological aspects and 
the entities that threaten and are threatened. The Epistemology section includes aspects specific to 
intelligence activity, with the analysis of the traditional (Singer) model, and a possible 
epistemological approach through the concept of tacit knowledge developed by scientist Michael 
Polanyi. In the Methodology section there are various methodological theories with an emphasis 
on structural analytical techniques, and some analogies with science, archeology, business and 
medicine. In Conclusions I argue on the possibility of a more scientific approach to methods of 
intelligence gathering and analysis of intelligence agencies. 
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1 Introduction 
Information is power. This perception has intensified during the Second World War, when 
several intelligence agencies has been formalized and significantly increased. In all countries, new 
agencies and departments have been set up to deal with threats. Governments are currently 
spending huge amounts for the intelligence agencies that are considered a major component of 
national security systems. The intelligence agencies are primarily responsible for identifying and 
preventing threats to national security, promptly and effectively informing decision-makers about 
these threats, and accurate and timely assessments and predictions of future conflicts or threats. 
Intelligence includes a wide variety of meanings in different contexts, from daily to 
technical. Stewart believes that the transformation of information into knowledge is a critical one, 
which is the basis for creating value and competitive advantage for modern activities. (Stewart 
2001) 
The process of intelligence gathering, processing and analyzing is a major concern for 
today's society, with the help of areas such as information technology, information systems, and 
information science. For this purpose, specific processes and techniques are used for gathering or 
generating intelligence, processing it through analysis and synthesis, generating predictions and 
strategies, transmitting and presenting it to decision maker, and storing it.  
Information science deals with analyzing, collecting, classifying, manipulating, storing, 
retrieving and disseminating information. (Sfetcu 2016) It is often (mistakenly) considered a 
branch of computer science. Information science addresses systemic problems from the 
perspective of the people involved and can be considered as a response to technological 
determinism. The information philosophy studies the specific conceptual aspects, including the 
investigation of conceptual nature and the basic principles of information, their dynamics, their 
use, and the elaboration and application of theoretical information and specific methodologies. 
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(Floridi 2002) In information science, an ontology formally represents knowledge as a set of 
concepts, and the relationship between these concepts. 
Information extraction is the science of document search, document information, and 
document metadata, as well as search in relational databases and the Internet. Each type of search 
has its own features, theories, practices and technologies. Access to information is a field of 
research aimed at automating the processing of large and cumbersome amounts of information and 
simplifying users' access to them. The information architecture focuses on the principles of design 
and architecture in the digital landscape based on a model or concept of information being used in 
intelligence analysis activities. Information management involves collecting and managing 
information from one or more sources and distributing this information to one or more segments. 
Knowledge representation is a field of research that aims to represent knowledge in symbols to 
facilitate the interference between these elements of knowledge and the creation of new elements 
of knowledge. Exploring the representation of knowledge implies an analysis of the reasoning. 
Logic is used to provide formal semantics of how reasoning functions should be applied to symbols 
in the knowledge representation system, and to define how operators can process and reshape 
knowledge. (Deshmukh and Ali 2014) 
Information systems are organized for collecting, organizing, storing and communicating 
information. The field of information systems is complementary to that of collecting, filtering, 
processing, creating and distributing data. (Sfetcu 2016) Any specific information system is 
intended to support operations, management and decision-making. (Bulgacs 2013) Information 
systems interrelate with data systems and activity systems on the other, being a communications 
system in which data is represented and is processed as a form of social memory. An information 
system can also be considered a semi-formal language that supports decision-making and human 
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action. Silver et al. have provided two perspectives for SI including software, hardware, data, 
people, and procedures. (Silver, Markus, and Beath 1995) Zheng offered another approach to the 
information system, (Zheng 2014) which also adds essential system processes and elements such 
as environment, limit, purpose, and interactions. 
1.1. History 
Collecting, analyzing, and using information about opponents have existed since ancient 
times. Sun Tzu, an ancient Chinese strategist in the Art of War, (Yuen 2014) stressed the need to 
understand yourself and the enemy through information, identifying different roles: the secret 
agent, the penetration agent, and the misinformation agent. Sun Tzu highlighted the need for a 
methodology and noted the role of counterinformation, double agents and psychological warfare. 
In India, in the 4th century BC, Chanakya (also called Kautilya) wrote Arthashastra, a state 
management and political economy manual, providing a detailed methodology of intelligence 
gathering, processing, and consumption operations as an indispensable means for maintaining and 
expanding the security and state power. (Shoham and Liebig 2016) King David IV of Georgia, at 
the beginning of the twelfth century, used spies to discover feudal conspiracy and infiltration into 
key locations. (Aladashvili 2017) The Aztecs used traders and diplomats with diplomatic immunity 
for espionage. (Soustelle 2002) 
Francis Walsingham was the first European to use modern espionage methods in 
Elizabethan England, helping with experts in various fields. (Andrew 2018) In the eighteenth 
century there was a dramatic expansion of espionage activities. In France under the King Louis 
XIV (1643-1715) and under the leadership of Cardinal Mazarin (1642-1661), a well-organized 
information system was set up. To cope with the wars with France, London has also set up a system 
designed to gather information about France and other powers. During the American Revolution, 
Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of Intelligence Agencies 
6 
1775-1783, US General George Washington successfully developed an espionage system to detect 
British locations and plans, being the "First Spy of America". (Nagy 2016) 
During the American Civil War (1861-1865), Allan Pinkerton first operated a detective 
agency, then serving as Head of the Union Intelligence Service in the early years. The Austrian 
Empire founded the Evidenzbureau in 1850 as the first permanent military intelligence service. 
The topographic and statistical department of T&SD was established at the British War Office as 
an embryonic military intelligence organization. The French Ministry of War authorized the 
creation, on June 8, 1871, of the Deuxième Bureau, a service tasked with conducting "research on 
enemy plans and operations." In Germany, Marshal Helmuth von Moltke set up a military 
intelligence unit, Abteilung (Section IIIb), of the German General Staff in 1889, which expanded 
constantly operating in France and Russia. The Ufficio Informazioni del Commando Supremo of 
Italy was permanently established in 1900. After the defeat of Russia in the Russian-Japanese War 
of 1904-05, the Russian military service was reorganized under the Seventh Division of the 
imperial second executive committee. 
In the United Kingdom, the Secret Service (OSS), set up in 1909 as the first independent 
and interdepartmental agency to control all spy government activities, was divided between an 
external service and counterintelligence in 1910. With the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, 
all major powers had very sophisticated structures for training and manipulating spies and for 
processing intelligence obtained through espionage. At that time, modern techniques of espionage 
were sought and refined to obtain military intelligence, sabotage and propaganda. Two new 
methods for intelligence gathering were developed during the war - aerial recognition and 
shooting, and interception and decryption of radio signals. (Wheeler 2012) 
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During the Second World War, Churchill's order has been devised to train spies and 
saboteurs under the command of the SOE (Special Operations Executive) and ultimately involve 
the United States in their training facilities. OSS's research and analysis branch has brought 
together many academics and experts who have proven to be particularly useful to provide a very 
detailed overview of the strengths and weaknesses of the German war effort. 
MI5 in the UK and the US FBI identified all the German spies and "turned" them into 
double agents, so their reports to Berlin were rewritten by counterintelligence teams. The FBI 
played a leading role in American counter-intelligence and gathered together all the German spies 
in June 1941. (Persico 2002) Counterintelligence included the use of agents to disinform Nazi 
Germany about the impact points during the blitz and isolation of the Japanese in the US against 
the Japanese espionage program during the war. 
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was particularly successful in introducing spies 
into the UK and West Germany but failed in the United States. NATO, on the other hand, also had 
some important successes. 
The focus on the intentions and capabilities of the Soviet Union has dominated thinking in 
Western intelligence communities. In analyzing information in the 1950s, Walter Laqueur argues 
that Soviet military capabilities and intentions remain the most important subject for US secret 
services. (Laqueur 1993) 
After the Cold War, governments and intelligence agencies continued to use the 
conventional model to assess state threats. But security concepts have faded from a highly 
militarized confrontation between known adversaries and increased concern over non-state threats 
that were harder to identify. Non-state actors have become strategic threats, the concept of 
"strategic terrorism" being developed as soon as the September 2001 attacks. Bruce Berkowitz 
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argues that there have been terrorist actions in the past, but bin Laden was the first to use 
widespread strategic terrorism against a Super power. (B. Berkowitz 2002) Globalization and 
people and technology mobility have favored non-state actors. (Waltz 2003) The CIA Director, 
James Woolsey, told the House of Representatives Committee for National Security in the United 
States that "we were fighting with a dragon for some 45 years and slew the dragon and then found 
ourselves in a jungle full of a number of poisonous snakes. And that in many ways, the snakes are 
a lot harder to keep track of than the dragon ever was." (Woolsey 1998) In 2007, Jonathan Evans, 
the UK's chief security officer (MI5), described the terrorist threat as "the most immediate and 
acute threat to peace in the history of my 98-year service." (Evans 2007) 
Government publications in developed countries, following the September 11, 2001 attack, 
reflected a consensus that intelligence services are key to preventing mass attacks. 
Currently in the United States there are seventeen (Intelligence.gov 2013) federal agencies 
forming the United States Intelligence Community. The Central Intelligence Agency uses the 
National Clandestine Service (NCS) (CIA.gov 2009a) for intelligence gathering and undercover 
operations. (CIA.gov 2009b) The National Security Agency collects information from the signals. 
Initially, the CIA led the US-IC. Following the Sept. 11 attacks, the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence (ODNI) was created to promote the exchange of intelligence. 
2. Intelligence activity 
Michael Goodman believes that although intelligence is not a new phenomenon, the 
academic study of it is an emerging field. (Goodman 2007) The intelligence cycle is generally 
considered to be composed of five phases: planning and targeting; collect; collection; analyze; and 
dissemination. (Diane Publishing Company 2000) The most important point in the information 
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cycle is considered the analysis. Mike McConnell says that intelligence can only help, inform and 
to make decisions if information is processed through an analyst's mind. (McConnell 2007) 
Thus, United States’ National Intelligence Strategy supports the need to "“strengthen 
analytic expertise, methods, and practices; tap expertise wherever it resides; and explore 
alternative analytic views." (Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2005) Arthur Hulnick 
writes that "“[t]he intelligence community needs to develop a twenty-first century analytic culture 
that differs from the conventional intuitive analysis of the past." (Hulnick 2006) To note Rob 
Johnston's effort to develop a taxonomy of intelligence analysis, arguing that "intelligence needs 
methodologists to help strengthen the domain of analysis." (Johnston 2003) 
David Singer states that the threat is now the main target of intelligence agencies. This idea 
is also argued by Ken Robertson in his effort to define intelligence: 
"A satisfactory definition of intelligence ought to make reference to the following: threats, states, 
secrecy, collection, analysis, and purpose. The most important of these is threat, since 
without threats there would be no need for intelligence services." (K. Robertson 1996) 
Carl Von Clausewitz in "On War" (1832) defines information activity as "every sort of 
information about the enemy and his country—the basis, in short, of our own plans and 
operations." A study of analytical culture has set the following definitions in consensus: 
• Intelligence is a secret state or group activity to understand or influence foreign or national 
entities. 
• The analysis of information consists in the application of individual and collective 
cognitive methods to weigh data and test hypotheses in a secret socio-cultural context. 
• Informational errors are factual inaccuracies in analysis resulting from insufficient or 
missing data. Informational failure is a failed prediction resulting from incorrect, missing, 
rejected, or inappropriate assumptions. (Johnston 2005) 
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Stephen Marrin considers two reasons for the failure of the development of intelligence 
theory: (Marrin 2012b) 1) the fact that consensus has not yet been reached on the definitions that 
are precursors of the formulation of the theory, and 2) intelligence is a applied field, practitioners 
being basically against theorizations. 
Intelligence can be considered as the process through which certain types of information 
are requested, collected, analyzed and disseminated, and how certain types of secret actions are 
conceived and carried out. (Shulsky and Schmitt 2002) Berkowitz equates the information 
community with that of a "Weberian classical" bureaucracy, characterized by centralized planning, 
routine operations and a hierarchical chain of command, manifested in the traditional informational 
cycle, like an assembly line. (B. D. Berkowitz and Goodman 2000) 
"Intelligence is more than information. It is knowledge that has been specially prepared for a 
customer's unique circumstances. The word knowledge highlights the need for human 
involvement. Intelligence collection systems produce ... data, not intelligence; only the 
human mind can provide that special touch that makes sense of data for different customers' 
requirements. The special processing that partially defines intelligence is the continual 
collection, verification, and analysis of information that allows us to understand the 
problem or situation in actionable terms and then tailor a product in the context of the 
customer's circumstances. If any of these essential attributes is missing, then the product 
remains information rather than intelligence." (Brei 1996) 
In intelligence analysis, specialists distinguish three types of information products: 
(Duvenage 2010) 
Operational intelligence, that assists and directs the collection or investigation on a 
continuous basis, and where the analyst is usually part of the investigation team, finalized by 
memorandums, operational plans and status reports, and visual analytical support such as 
diagrams, visual images, etc. 
Current intelligence, which contextualizes the "snapshots" of an event or problem for the 
client in the form of text. 
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Strategic intelligence, that provides the client with estimates and/or warnings by presenting 
medium and long-term analysis of the nature, dynamics and impact of an event or problem. 
2.1. Organizations 
Intelligence services are government agencies that deal with the collection and analysis of 
sensitive information in order to ensure national security and defense. The methods of intelligence 
gathering can include spying, interception of communications, cryptanalysis, cooperation with 
other institutions, and assessment of public sources. (Sfetcu 2016) 
Intelligence services are currently focusing on the fight against terrorism, leaving relatively 
little resources to monitor other security threats. For this reason, they often ignore external 
information activities that do not pose immediate threats to their government's interests. (Ehrman 
2011) 
Extremely few external services - CIA, SVR and, to a lesser extent, SIS, French DGSE and 
Mossad - operate globally. Almost all other services focus on immediate neighbors or regions. 
These services usually depend on relationships with these global services for information on areas 
beyond their immediate neighborhoods, and often sell their regional expertise for what they need 
globally. 
Intelligence services are prisoners of government bureaucracy, subject to the same political 
forces and tendencies as any other. The political situations of intelligence services in authoritarian, 
totalitarian or corrupt states are more difficult to determine. The absence of effective legal 
frameworks and the importance of personal networks towards institutional relations for decision 
make it difficult to study. Examples in the history of communist block service suggests, however, 
that in these countries their intelligence services positions may be paradoxical. The dependence of 
these regimes on their repressive services, the integration of services into the governing apparatus, 
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and the absence of any external control, offer to services immunity from external investigations 
and the pressure of reforms. (Ehrman 2011) 
Even when acting legally, intelligence services protect and promote their interests. The 
result is that services are almost always engaged in complex political struggles on several fronts. 
The most important of these is the constant effort to raise as many resources as possible - people, 
funds and influence on decision-making - from their political superiors, and to oppose external 
changes. 
Intelligence services are not robotic institutions, but rather hundreds or thousands of people 
who make and execute decisions. There are few sociological or comparative open-source studies 
of intelligence officers. Foreign service officers tend to be of higher socio-economic classes. The 
nature of their work - living and operating in other countries, presenting themselves as diplomats 
or businessmen and interacting with political leaders in the country and abroad - requires university 
education, knowledge of languages and culture, and trust in interaction with diplomatic officials 
and politicians. People with these characteristics usually come from the upper middle class or 
above. Internal service officers tend to be from working classes and from lower middle classes. 
Their work is similar to police work, and as they perform their tasks on their home ground, the 
pulse of the street is more important than sophisticated elegance. (Richelson 1988, 72) (Shelley 
1990, 479–520) 
A feature of both internal and external services is that they behave like a caste. Except for 
the director, no outsiders hold a position of authority; In the world of intelligence, ambitious 
politicians, advocates, think tank analysts, and academics, who usually run in government 
positions, do not get in. 
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John Ehrman says that intelligence service management tends to be mediocre. (Ehrman 
2011) In general, high-performance case officers assume leadership positions. Usually, they do 
not have any management training before taking up these positions, and then receive little 
systematic training. As a result, mid-level and top-level managers often have little interest in 
overseeing critical administrative and planning details or taking initiatives to change or upgrade 
services before a failure or crisis forces them to do so. 
The main objective of intelligence organizations is to ensure security, a concept that 
assesses the degree of resistance or protection to what is bad. Certain concepts are common to 
several security domains: 
• Warranty - the level of guarantee that a security system will behave as it has been evaluated 
• Countermeasure - the way to stop a threat from triggering a risk event 
• Defense in depth - never rely on just one measure 
• Risk - a possible event that could cause a loss 
• Threat - a way to trigger a dangerous event 
• Vulnerability - a weakness of a target that can be exploited by a security threat 
• Exploitation - a vulnerability triggered by a threat. 
Robert M. Clark believes that an organization is a system that "can be viewed and analyzed 
from three perspectives: structure, function, and process." (Clark 2003, 277) The structure 
describes the parts of the organization, with an emphasis on individuals and the relationships 
between them. The function describes the organization's product with a focus on decision-making. 
And the process describes the activities and knowledge that form the final product. 
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2.2. Intelligence cycle 
The intelligence cycle is a set of processes used to provide useful information for decision-
making. The cycle consists of several processes. The related counter-intelligence area is tasked 
with preventing information efforts from others. 
 
Figure 1 Intelligence cycle or process 
A basic model of the process of collecting and analyzing information is called the 
"intelligence cycle". This model can be applied, and, like all the basic models, it does not reflect 
the fullness of real-world operations. Through intelligence cycle activities, information is collected 
and assembled, raw information is transformed into processed information, analyzed and made 
available to users. The intelligence cycle consists of five phases: 
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1. Planning and Targeting: Decide what needs to be monitored and analyzed. This involves 
determining information requirements, developing an adequate intelligence architecture, 
preparing a collection plan, issuing orders and requests to intelligence agencies. 
2. Preparation and Collecting: Establishing an intelligence officers' own strategy, gathering 
raw information using a variety of collection types, such as human sources (HUMINT), 
geo-spatial sources (GEOINT), etc. 
3. Processing and Exploitation: Refining and primary use of information in primary 
decisions. 
4. Analysis and Production: The processed information is translated into a finalized 
intelligence product, which may include the resulting syntheses, predictions and 
intelligence measures. 
5. Dissemination: Providing intelligence products to consumers (including those in the 
intelligence community) 
In addition to these phases, a sixth step, not only in the intelligence activity, but in 
cooperation with customers and observing the operational environment for the effectiveness of the 
information provided, is very important: 
6. Evaluation and feedback 
These steps are generally divided within an intelligence organization. The number of steps 
varies according to the strategy of each intelligence organization, some organizations compressing 
some of these steps (eg, analysis and production is included in the processing and exploitation 
phase), or by adding other steps according to the specific requirements. 
The initial phase of planning and targeting of the intelligence cycle includes four major 
stages: 
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1. Identification and prioritization of information requirements; 
2. Development of an adequate intelligence architecture; 
3. Preparing a gathering plan; and 
4. Issuing order and requests to the intelligence organizations. 
The collection coordination intelligence requirements management (CCIRM) is the NATO 
doctrine of intelligence gathering management, although it differs from the US doctrine. 
In the "analysis and production phase", the information is processed only after it has been 
verified by all available sources, their veracity increasing according to the number and quality of 
the additional checks. 
Intelligence activity is an iterative process in interaction with many actors, so the process 
of intelligence activity can be characterized as dialectical in that a given hypothesis can be 
confirmed, revised or rejected based on additional information from other disciplines. 
An important condition for the efficiency of intelligence as a finished product is the speed 
and accuracy of communications between the involved actors. 
From an epistemological point of view, it is still unclear when the intelligence becomes 
knowledge: during the collection, after the analysts have been further verified, after their approval 
at the organization level, or when an independent body confirms the analysis? 
Another aspect to be considered in the intelligence cycle is the relationship with the legal 
system, as the role of the various actors in the intelligence process is less clear than those involved 
in the legal act. Human sources can be motivated by numerous personal biases. For example, an 
analyst may benefit from subtle incentives to reach a conclusion, or information collectors may be 
forced to collect only certain information. (Morgan 2012) That is why there must be an institutional 
mechanism that can challenge the assumptions and conclusions made during the intelligence 
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analysis. In this sense, some intelligence organizations use a so-called "red team analysis", an 
alternative analysis of information and conclusions in intelligence products. (US Department of 
the Army 1995) According to the former CIA officer Richard Heuer, such an alternative analysis 
has the potential to use specific techniques to determine where "analyzes" were "wrong". (Heuer 
1999) 
Military strategist John Boyd created a different decision and action model (OODA), (Boyd 
1976) useful in many areas of conflict. Its model has four phases: 1) Observing a threat or 
opportunity; 2) Orientation in the context of other information; 3) Decision based on the best 
action plan; 4) Action to carry out the plan. Each new iteration of the cycle is faster than the 
previous one, due to the accumulated experience. By comparing it with the traditional intelligence 
cycle, observation could be an output of the collection phase, while orientation is an output of 
analysis. 
2.3 Intelligence gathering 
A process of intelligence gathering begins when a user enters a query into the system. 
Several objects can match the result of a query with different degrees of relevance. Most systems 
estimate a numeric value about how well each object matches the query and classifies objects 
according to this value. Many researches have focused on practices of intelligence gathering. Much 
of this research was based on the work of Leckie, Pettigrew and Sylvain, who in 1996 carried out 
an extensive review of the information science literature on the search for information by 
professionals. The authors have proposed an analytical model of the behavior of search 
professionals seeking to be generalizable across the profession, thus providing a future research 
platform in the field. The model was designed to "prompt new insights... and give rise to more 
refined and applicable theories of information seeking." (Leckie, Pettigrew, and Sylvain 1996, 
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188) The distinctive sign of the intelligence activity is to find the type of information others want 
to conceal. 
Knowledge engineering was defined by Edward Feigenbaum, and Pamela McCorduck as 
follows: (Feigenbaum and McCorduck 1984) 
"Knowledge engineering is an engineering discipline that involves integrating knowledge into 
computer systems in order to solve complex problems normally requiring a high level of 
human expertise." 
Currently, knowledge engineering refers to building, maintaining and developing 
knowledge-based systems. Knowledge engineering is related to mathematical logic, and heavily 
involved in cognitive sciences and socio-cognitive engineering where knowledge is produced by 
socio-cognitive aggregates (especially human) and is structured according to our understanding of 
how human rationality and logic work. 
In knowledge engineering, knowledge gathering consists in establishing knowledge from 
structured and unstructured sources in a way that must represent knowledge in a way that facilitates 
inference. The result of the extraction goes beyond establishing structured information or 
transforming it into a relational scheme, requiring either reuse of existing formal knowledge 
(identifiers or ontologies) or generating a system based on source data. (Sfetcu 2016) 
Traditional information extraction is a natural language processing technology that extracts 
information from language texts and their typically natural structures in an appropriate way. The 
types of information to be identified must be specified in a model before the process starts, so the 
entire process of extracting traditional information is domain dependent. The extraction of 
information is divided into the following five secondary tasks: (Cunningham 2006) 
• Named Entity Recognizing (REN) - Recognizing and classifying all named entities 
contained in a text, using grammar-based methods or statistical models. 
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• Coreference resolution (CO) - identifies equivalent entities that have been recognized by 
REN in a text. 
• Construction of the template element (TE) - identifies the descriptive properties of the 
entities, recognized by REN and CO. 
• Construction of the template relationship (TR) - identifies the relationships that exist 
between the template elements. 
• Production of the script template (ST) - will be identified and structured according to 
entities recognized by REN and CO and relationships identified by TR. 
In ontology-based information mining, at least one ontology is used to guide the process 
of extracting information from the text in natural language. The OBIE system uses traditional 
information extraction methods to identify concepts, cases and relationships of ontologies used in 
the text, which will be structured in an ontology after the process. Thus, entering ontologies is the 
model of information to be extracted. (Wimalasuriya and Dejing Dou 2010, 306–23) Ontology 
learning automates the process of constructing ontologies in natural language. 
Information published in media around the world can be classified and treated as secret 
when it becomes an intelligence product. All sources are secret, and intelligence is defined to 
exclude open sources. (K. G. Robertson 1987) 
Closed or secret sources involve "special means" to reach information, and the technique 
may include manipulation, interrogation, the use of technical devices, and extensive use of 
criminal methods. These techniques are costly, time consuming and labor intensive compared to 
open source methods. In some cases, hidden collection methods have a strong association with the 
criminal world. Noam Chomsky noted that there are good reasons why intelligence services are so 
closely linked to criminal activities. 
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"Clandestine terror," he argued, "requires hidden funds, and the criminal elements to whom the 
intelligence agencies naturally turn expect a quid pro quo." (Chomsky 1992) 
The discovery of knowledge involves an automatic process of searching for large volume 
data, using data mining, and based on similar methodologies and terminologies. (Wimalasuriya 
and Dejing Dou 2010, 306–23) Data mining creates abstractions of input data, and the knowledge 
gained through the process can become additional data that can be used later. (Cao 2010) 
Investigations in the data collection process are aimed at enriching information, eliminating 
some doubts, or solving problems. 
The process of intelligence gathering from people (abbreviated HUMINT) is achieved 
through interpersonal contacts. NATO defines HUMINT as "a category of intelligence derived 
from information collected and provided by human sources." (NATO 2018) Typical HUMINT 
activities consist of queries and conversations with people who have access to information. The 
way HUMINT operations are conducted is dictated by both the official protocol and the nature of 
the information source. 
Sources may be neutral, friendly or hostile and may or may not be aware of their 
involvement in intelligence gathering. 
The HUMINT gathering process involves selecting source people, identifying them and 
conducting interviews. The analysis of information can help with biographical and cultural 
information. Lloyd F. Jordan recognizes two forms of culture study, both of which are relevant to 
HUMINT. (Jordan 2008) 
Coverage methods are complicated and dangerous but raise ethical and moral questions as 
well. A well-known technique, for example, is the manipulation of human agents to obtain the 
information. The process, known as "the development of controlled sources," may involve 
extensive use of psychological manipulation, blackmail, and financial rewards. (Godfrey 1978) 
Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of Intelligence Agencies 
21 
Intelligence gathering applying these techniques work in hostile environments. But intelligence, 
Sherman Kent argued, could be likened to familiar means of seeking the truth. (Kent 1966) 
Intelligence, unlike any other profession, does not work according to known moral or ethical 
standards. Some of these standards tend to be, at best, cosmetic. The argument is that anything 
vital to national survival is acceptable in any situation, even when the method provokes everything 
that is democratic. Clandestine operations remain unclear in international law and there is very 
little scientific research to cover the subject. 
2.4. Intelligence analysis 
The analysts are in the field of "knowledge". Intelligence refers to knowledge and the types 
of problems addressed are knowledge problems. So, we need a concept of work based on 
knowledge. We need a basic understanding of what we know and how we know, what we do not 
know, and even what can be known and what is not known. (Vandepeer 2014) Matthew Herbert 
offers a useful set of principles in discussing the guidance reported by Colin Powell to US 
intelligence director Mike McConnell. It is said that Powell advised McConnell as follows: 
"As an intelligence officer, your responsibility is to tell me what you know. Tell me what you don’t 
know. Then you’re allowed to tell me what you think. But you always keep those three 
separated." (Weiner 2007) 
The analysis of information involves "turning disparate facts into focused conclusion." 
(Codevilla 1992) 
No definition is conclusive in clarifying the meaning of the analysis. Likewise, the same 
person or group of people can achieve a multitude of roles in the process cycle, sometimes 
demanded by analysis. 
The analysis should provide a useful basis for conceptualizing intelligence functions, of 
which the most important are "estimation" and "prediction". The intelligence itself, in its basic 
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form, has a decision-making function. A decision is characterized by two main functions: (1) 
choices or judgments between competing alternatives, and (2) uncertainty of choices and 
judgments. 
John Maynard Keynes states that, under uncertainty, "there is no scientific basis on which 
to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know." (Keynes 1937) It follows 
that, in the absence of certainty, the decision-maker may be obliged to take measures with 
uncertain consequences, or to base his election on the predictions of the future, an exercise of 
subjective reasoning. 
Radner described a characteristic optimal decision as follows: "For each signal, an optimal 
decision maximizes the conditional expected utility of the consequence, given the signal," as 
principle described as "maximizing conditional expected utility". (Radner 1972) 
Researchers used concepts such as "incomplete information" and "uncertainty decisions" 
to study group interactions based on the (subjective) nature of the information that actors possess. 
(Ekpe 2005) For example, Andrew Kydd used the incomplete information model to explain Jervis's 
"spiral model of escalation in arms races". (Kydd 1997) The theory of uncertainty decisions also 
belongs to this family of incomplete knowledge behavior or actions conditioned by subjective 
feelings. As Arrow Kenneth observes, "uncertainty" means that the agent does not know the state 
of the world. (Arrow 1966) 
Intelligence analysis applies individual and collective cognitive methods to assess data and 
test assumptions in a secret socio-cultural context. (Hayes 2007) The analyst must detect 
deceptions and extract the truth. The purpose of intelligence analysis is to reduce ambiguity. 
Assuming that enemies try to create confusion is not paranoid in the case of analysts, but realistic. 
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According to Dick Heuer, in an experiment in which the analyst's behavior was studied, the process 
is incremental refining. 
 
Figure 2 The intelligence activity reflects a progressive refinement of data and information 
Academic disciplines examining the art and science of intelligence analysis are most 
commonly called "intelligence studies" and taught in specific institutions. 
The analyst must constantly ask what want/must clients to know, how does they prefer the 
presentation to be? Are they trying to choose the best way of action or they have already chosen it 
and now they must know the obstacles and vulnerabilities on the chosen path? 
Sometimes, when the producer strives to meet the needs of both internal and external 
customers, the solution is to create two different types of products, one for each type of customer. 
An internal product may contain details about sources, collection methods and analytical 
techniques, while an external product is more journalistic: Which? What? When? Where? Why? 
"How" is often relevant to journalists, but not recommended in the intelligence activity. Actions 
are grouped in three stages: 
1. The decision to act 
2. Action 
3. Disengagement from action (Ikle 2005) 
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Heuristic or semantic maps can help structure information, just like file folders and 
indexing cards. Also, databases with statistical techniques such as correlation, factor analysis, and 
time series analysis can provide insight. 
The purpose of the information analysis is to reveal to a certain decision maker the 
underlying significance of the selected information. Analysts should start with confirmed facts, 
apply specialist knowledge to produce plausible findings but less secure conclusions, and even 
predict when the forecast is properly qualified. Analysts should not, however, engage in guesses 
that have no basis in facts. 
Intelligence analysis involves the development of recommended predictions of action, 
based on a wide range of available sources of information, both open and undercover. The analysis 
is developed in response to the requirements of the organization's or client's management to help 
make decisions. (Sfetcu 2016) 
One of the techniques used in intelligence analysis is the analysis of indicators, which uses 
historical data to expose trends and identify future major changes in an area of interest, helping to 
develop evidence-based prognoses with low cognitive bias. (Heuer and Pherson 2010) 
Structured analytical techniques (SAT) have come to be used more since the World Trade 
Tower attacks of September 11, 2001, when the United States National Commission for Terrorist 
Action, or the 9/11 Commission, found that the intelligence community suffered "a failure to 
challenge analytic mindsets, examine key assumptions, consider alternative hypotheses, and detect 
deceptive reporting." (Pherson 2013) These analytical tools, designed to better manage and 
standardize the performance of the analysis, are an attempt to align the profession to scientific 
principles. From an epistemological point of view, it can be argued that SATs generate 
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propositional knowledge and inadequately acknowledge the value of "tacit knowledge" or 
unprotected knowledge in the problem-solving process in intelligence analysis. (Gentry 2015) 
Indicators may be unique events or actions from a factor that signifies a major change, 
affecting conditions in the rest of the categories or other categories, or a combination of events 
that serve a similar function. The process is as follows: 
1. Identify a set of categories relevant to the requirement 
2. Identify a set of relevant factors for each category in the context of the global requirement 
3. Identify short-term scenarios that may result from the immediate transfer or improvement 
of each factor 
4. Identify a series of events or indicators that could mean improvement or deterioration 
within each factor 
5. Review historical and ongoing events for indicators within each factor 
6. Identify unique indicators and indicator trends to predict which short-term scenario is most 
likely to occur. (US Government 2009) 
U.S. Intelligence Community standardizes its lists of indicators within an agency or across 
the community. (Artner, Girven, and Bruce 2016) 
A common form of intelligence analysis is the use of social networking data, both on the 
Internet and on the mobile. Many government agencies are investing heavily in research involving 
social networking. Intelligence communities believe that the biggest threat comes from de-
centralizing, without leaders, the geographical dispersal of terrorists, extremists, and other 
subversive and dissident people. These types of threats are the easiest to counteract by discovering 
important nodes in the network and eliminating them. For this, a detailed network map is required. 
(Hogan, Carrasco, and Wellman 2007) It is considered that the use of social networking sites is a 
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form of "participatory surveillance", where users of these sites are practically supervising 
themselves, displaying detailed personal information on public sites where can be seen by 
corporations and governments. 
2.5. Counterintelligence 
According to William Johnson's definition counterintelligence (CI) is an activity designed 
to protect an intelligence organization against state or non-state agents. (Johnson and Hood 2009) 
It includes the collection and analysis of specific information, and preventive and counter-
offensive activities against intentions and actions directed against national security, including 
terrorism. (Conrad 1985) 
In US doctrine, CI is now seen primarily as a counterbalance to the actions of foreign 
intelligence services (FIS HUMINT). In the US Army's counterintelligence manual of 1995, CI 
had a broader scope. More recently, the American Doctrine of the Information Community 
(Matschulat 2007) limits the main purpose to activities that usually include counter-terrorism. The 
scope of the doctrine of US military counterintelligence has been shifted to a classified publication, 
Joint Publication (JP) 2-01.2, Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support to Joint 
Operations. For each type of specific foreign action, countermeasures are provided both with 
defensive and offensive role. 
Counter-HUMINT deals with the detection of hostile or potentially hostile HUMINT 
sources, responsible for monitoring reliable staff to prevent and neutralize risks. (US Department 
of the Army 1981) 
Offensive techniques in today's counterintelligence doctrine are directed mainly against 
human sources, so counterintelligence can be considered synonymous with offensive 
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counterintelligence. Offensive counter-attack (and counter-terrorism) acts either by manipulating 
an opponent (FIS or terrorist) or by interrupting the opponent's operations. 
Counterintelligence is primarily considered an analytical discipline, focusing on the study 
of intelligence services. Taking this into consideration, John Ehrman (Ehrman 2009) proposes an 
appropriate definition of CI:  
"Counterintelligence is the study of the organization and behavior of the intelligence services of 
foreign states and entities, and the application of the resulting knowledge." (Samuelson and 
Nordhaus 1992, 53) 
The basis of all counterintelligence activities is the study of individual intelligence services, 
an analytical process to understand the behavior of foreign entities (formal mission, internal and 
external policy, history and myths within the entity, the people who compose it). 
CI operations are a specialized subassembly of intelligence operations in general, usually 
trying to create endless feedback loops. In general, there are three types of counterintelligence 
operations: classic penetration, double agents, and identification and monitoring of the agents of 
the concerned service. 
Counterintelligence is an under-theoreticized field without a clearly defined methodology. 
John Ehrman identifies several future research directions, such as service policy, service sociology, 
and counterintelligence economy. Also, future counterintelligence studies in the construction of 
theory should include comparative and literary studies. A robust counterintelligence theory will 
have to put the analysis at the center of counterintelligence activity and allow for a 
multidisciplinary and integrated approach to analytical and operational activities. 
2.6. Epistemic communities 
Epistemic communities are informal networks of knowledge-based experts who influence 
decision-makers in defining issues they face, identifying different solutions, and evaluating results. 
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(Hsu and Hasmath 2017) Peter M. Haas defined the conceptual framework of an epistemic 
community as 
"... a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain 
and an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area." 
(Haas 1992, 3) 
Members of an epistemic community come from academic or professional backgrounds 
and are characterized by a set of unifying features. (Sebenius 1992) 
Epistemic communities are socio-psychological entities that create and justify knowledge. 
Michel Foucault referred to the mathesis as a rigorous episteme appropriate to allow the cohesion 
of a discourse and thus the unification of a community. In the philosophy of science and system 
science, the process of forming a self-sustaining epistemic community is sometimes called a 
mentality, similar to a trend or a faction in politics. 
A counterpart of what is NOT an epistemic community is provided by Mai'a K. Davis 
Cross, considering the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the EU Intelligence Analysis Center 
(IntCen). (Cross 2015) Cross claims that although they are composed of high-level security 
experts, these two organizations are not epistemic communities. Real epistemic communities, 
diplomats, military experts, security researchers and civilian crisis management experts have 
significantly influenced EU security policy. 
Expert groups that are not epistemic communities are not poor or becoming cases. They 
can fundamentally be different types of actors with divergent features. 
An epistemic community rarely includes all members of a formal organization. A strong 
epistemic community is trying to overcome its professional role as a group and is often able to 
persuade decision makers to fundamentally change the nature of their political goals. 
An epistemic community is a group of people who do not have a specific history together 
but seek a common idea of origin as if they were an intentional community. For example, an 
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epistemic community can be found in a network of professionals from a wide variety of disciplines 
and backgrounds, (Keman 1998) including intelligence services. 
According to Haas, the epistemic communities: (1) share the professional opinion on a 
policy issue, (2) weigh the validity of their political objectives in their field of expertise, (3) engage 
in a common set of practices on the problematic area with the goal of improving human well-
being, and (4) sharing beliefs in principle. (Haas 2001, 11578–79) 
Epistemic communities also have a "normative component," meaning that the ultimate goal 
is always an improvement in society, rather than the own gain of the community itself. (Haas 1992) 
In international relations and political science, an epistemic community can also be referred 
to as a global network of knowledge-based professionals in science and technology that often 
affects political decisions. (Morin and Louafi 2017) 
Epistemic communities have the greatest influence in "conditions of political uncertainty 
and visibility," (Radaelli 1999, 763) usually following a crisis or triggering event. 
The European Union, with its ongoing processes of integration, shared democratic values, 
supranational institutions and transnational interactions, is very favorable to the formation of 
epistemic communities. (Loik 2013) The EU's security policy is an area where there are more 
epistemic communities based on Brussels. 
3. Ontology 
In intelligence, the ontological problem is related to the nature and characteristics of 
entities that threaten and are threatened. According to Eric Little and Galina Rogova, "[t]hreat is a 
very complex ontological item and, therefore, a proper threat ontology must be constructed in 
accordance with formal metaphysical principles that can speak to the complexities of the objects, 
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object attributes, processes, events and relations that make up these states of affairs." (Eric G. Little 
and Rogova 2006) 
Björn Müller-Wille's argument on security and threats helps to highlight the 
interdependence between threatening and threatened entities. In this sense, intelligence analysts 
must define both what constitutes a threat and what is threatened. Thus, a significant threat 
ontology must include both threats and threatened entities. (Vandepeer 2011) 
Developing a threat ontology requires a taxonomy. A potentially useful taxonomy used in 
describing the security analysis is provided by Buzan, Waever and Wilde. (Buzan et al. 1998) They 
argue that the security analysis involves three distinctive actors. From this taxonomy, adapted for 
the intelligence analysis, the following entities emerge: 
• a referent is what or who is threatened; 
• an analyst acts as a "threat determinant"; and 
• a threat actor who is evaluated by the analyst as threatening the referent. 
The threat referent is usually the state, namely the survival of the state and its population. 
(Singer 1958) Quadrennial Homeland Security Review describes security as the requirement to 
"“[p]rotect the United States and its people, vital interests, and way of life." (Department of 
Homeland Security 2010, ix) Globalization makes it increasingly difficult to identify the interests 
of the state, even of the population. Under the Montevideo Convention, the four generally accepted 
requirements for statehood are: a permanent population; defined territory; a government; and the 
ability to enter into relations with other states. (Australia Department of Defence 2009) These 
requirements generally refer to four aspects of a threatened state, namely: population, territory, 
government, and interests. The nature and characteristics of state and non-state threats consider 
how these entities can threaten these four factors. 
Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of Intelligence Agencies 
31 
State interests include threatening the political influence of the state, limiting the state's 
ability to develop favorable or strong relations with other states, regional stability, economic 
stability, development and financial infrastructure of the state, (Australia Department of Defence 
2009) energy resources, communication lines and citizens' ability to travel. 
Non-state actors (especially those who threaten) are often undefined. A useful definition 
for capturing them is "“...any person or group of people who act independently of formal 
governments." (Australia Department of Defence 2002) 
Threat evaluation is defined by Steinberg et al (Omand 2009) as "the process of estimating 
and anticipating the effects on the situations of planned or expected/anticipated actions by 
participants, including interactions between the action plans of several actors (e.g., assessing 
susceptibilities and vulnerabilities to estimated/projected threatened actions, considering their 
planned actions). " It follows that different functions and elements of threat assessment have to be 
considered. (Rudd 2008) The ontological complexity of threat elements requires ontological 
analysis based on metaphysics that can effectively classify different types of complex objects, 
properties and attributes, events, processes and relationships that are of interest to various decision 
makers. 
Situation and Threat Assessment (STA) processing refers to context-dependent 
information about the dynamic facets of reality (Eric G. Little and Rogova 2006) so that STA 
ontologies must be able to capture the reality structure by providing capabilities to describe the 
multitude of types of relationships (e.g., space-time, intentional, and dependency relationships) 
that exist between different situational entities (and their aggregations) at different levels of 
granularity. (Bittner and Smith 2003) For this reason, the ontologies to be used to assess the 
situation and threats require a wider understanding of the types of relations and relational entities 
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found initially in Aristotle's writings (Aristotle 1991) and later formalized by Edmund Husserl. 
(Husserl 1900) It is important for STA ontologies to be structured in a superior general 
metaphysical framework in order to break down the most abstract elements of the field of interest 
and the relationships between them. 
In An Ontological Analysis of Threat and Vulnerability, Eric G. Little and Galina L. 
Rogova developed a "threat ontology" (ThrO), (Eric G. Little and Rogova 2006) a modified 
version of the basic formal ontology (Grenon and Smith 2004) composed of two orthogonal sub-
levels, SNAP and SPAN, which are designed to capture the spatial and temporal features of 
ontology. Based on the distinction between the continuants and the occurents, they have 
ontologically modeled complex spatio-temporal objects with a formal bifurcation between objects 
as elements that can exist entirely at some point in space and time versus processual events whose 
parts and partial relationships are constantly evolving over time, and therefore there are never 
entirely in a certain place or time. The distinction helped to avoid certain traditional philosophical 
problems of identity. The basic formal ontology is designed in accordance with the theory of 
mereotopology, (B. Smith 1996) a theory that combines a logic of parts and partial relationships 
(e.g., mereology) with a logic of spatial expansion and connection (i.e., topology) language capable 
of treating the multitude of ontological objects required for higher-level fusion processing, e.g. 
objects, properties/attributes, spaces, times, and the many simple and complex relationships 
between them. The information used to assess the threats is extremely uncertain, contradictory, 
redundant, of varying importance and low fidelity. This makes it necessary to ”incorporate 
uncertainty, reliability, and imprecision into the characterization of qualitative mereotopological 
relations.” (Eric G. Little and Rogova 2006) 
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At a higher level, as a whole, people exist as relational entities, not just as collections of 
independent elements. The problem here is of ontological significance, where the modeling of the 
element collections is not the same as the modeling of the whole, because the same complex 
element can be understood differently depending on whether it is understood as a collection or as 
a whole. (B. Smith 1996) The theory of mereotopology provides a way to describe formally the 
types of complex partial relations between them that contain elements such as threats, in which the 
three elements of intent, capacity and opportunity are in a formal relationship fundamental 
dependence. The capture of metaphysical relationships, such as fundamental dependence, is 
necessary for the design of threats ontologies. Given the complexity of the threats, it is essential 
to design an ontological framework that can include many types of relationships necessary for the 
correct breakdown of complex elements. (Eric G. Little and Rogova 2006) 
The ontological definition of certain essential features of the parts and their relationships, 
together with proximity and constraint metrics, will then allow better definition and identification 
of dispersed groups. (E. G. Little and Rogova 2005) 
An ontology for threat analysis and action must be able to shape ontological distinctions 
between potential and viable threats. This provides a better understanding of how threats (ie 
intentions, capabilities, and opportunities) can exist and can be changed over time. Escalating 
threats from a state of potency to a state of viability could be avoided by using appropriate threat 
mitigation techniques. (E. G. Little and Rogova 2005) 
On the other hand, for Barry Smith in Ontology for the intelligence analyst, (B. Smith 
2012) the Strategy of Semantic Enhancement (SE) (Salmen et al. 2011) is based on the use of 
simple ontologies whose terms are used to mark (or annotate) source data artifacts in a coherent 
way. Terms in a SE ontology are linked together in a simple hierarchy through the relationship 
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"is_a" (or subtype). Each term appears once in this hierarchy and is paired in a stable way with 
parent and child hierarchy terms, even if new terms are added to ontology over time. This stability 
is important because the success of the strategy requires ontologies that can be repeatedly reused 
to annotate many different types of data in ways that serve multiple different community of 
analysts, thus contributing to creating an increasingly common operational picture. SE is designed 
to be at the same time more stable and more flexible than traditional approaches to harmonization 
and integration, which are usually based on ad hoc mapping between data models, their 
effectiveness over time often degrades. (B. Smith 2012) 
SE ontologies are organized on three levels with successive degrees of flexibility: 1) a 
unique, small, domain-neutral Upper-level Ontology (ULO), for which our selected candidate is 
the official ontology; (Volkswagen Foundation 2002) 2) Mid-level ontologies (MLO), formed by 
grouping terms that refer to specific areas of action or specific tasks such as inter-agency 
information exchange; (B. Smith, Vizenor, and Schoening 2009) 3) low-level ontologies (LLO) 
that focuses on specific areas. The SE approach is designed to be of maximum use to intelligence 
analyst users. Ontological content is created only as a response to analysts' situational needs, and 
architectural requirements are designed to ensure a consistent evolution of SE resources without 
sacrificing the flexibility and expressivity required in real-world deployment. (B. Smith 2012) The 
SE Strategy can determine collaborative ontological development and re-use for multiple internal 
and external data collection purposes. 
4. Epistemology 
In intelligence, epistemology is the study of the threat awareness and the way the threat is 
understood in the field of intelligence analysis. 
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Most definitions of intelligence do not consider the fact that the epistemic normative status 
of the intelligence analysis is knowledge rather than a lower alternative. Counter-arguments to the 
epistemological status of intelligence are their purpose-oriented action, and their future-oriented 
content. (Rønn and Høffding 2013) 
Following the attacks of September 11, a terrorism commission was set up to identify the 
failures and weaknesses of US intelligence agencies, to learn from security vulnerabilities and to 
avoid future attacks on national safety and security. The conclusion was that the US intelligence 
institutions lacked the imagination and ability to make relevant predictions - that is to connect the 
relevant "points" and reach relevant conclusions. (Anderson, Schum, and Twining 2009) 
Sherman Kent, in Strategic Intelligence (1949), divides the field into three components: 
(Kent 1966) knowledge, organization, and activity. In the opinion of Michael Herman in 
Intelligence Services in the Information Age (2001), the field of intelligence can be divided into: 
activity, subjects, product, and function. (Herman 2001) Scott and Jackson in The Study of 
Intelligence in Theory and Practice, introductory article in Intelligence and National Security 
Journal no. 19 of 2010, (Scott and Jackson 2004) complements Kent and Herman's divisions by 
providing an analysis of how to make significant distinctions in the field of intelligence. 
The intelligence contrasts with information and knowledge and can be placed in a 
pyramidal continuum of data, information and knowledge. (Dean and Gottschalk 2007) 
Intelligence can be inserted into two different positions: either between information and 
knowledge, or at the top of the knowledge hierarchy. (Rønn and Høffding 2013) 
In the first case, the intelligence is an epistemic step above the information: Geoff Dean 
and Petter Gottschalk consider that "intelligence is placed between information and knowledge on 
the continuum as ideally intelligence represents (...) a form of validated information." (Dean and 
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Gottschalk 2007) Normative understanding of intelligence can be seen as the most "plausible 
information." Intelligence is often referred to as "prior knowledge" understood as information and 
evaluation of future activities. (Wheaton and Beerbower 2006) Specifically, the pre-scientific 
attribute of the intelligence is characterized as a warning about events and potentially harmful 
actions. The question then is whether it disqualifies intelligence as knowledge. (Rønn and Høffding 
2013) 
If the intelligence is placed above knowledge, it is more than mere knowledge. Jerry 
Ratcliffe justifies this ranking as follows: 
"So why the extra step of adding intelligence to the continuum? It is due to the fact that intelligence 
products are inherently action products. In other words, knowledge products can generate 
understanding, but intelligence products are supposed to generate action." (Ratcliffe 2008) 
This means that intelligence generates "actionable knowledge". But this interpretation, 
though claiming that intelligence is a type of knowledge, seems to confuse its epistemic status with 
its normative function, that of actions and decisions of orientation. 
According to Simon Høffding, when we compare the epistemic status of intelligence 
according to the above positions, the relationship between information and knowledge in 
continuum is asymmetric due to the different level of plausibility and relevance. (Rønn and 
Høffding 2013) However, what matters is the agent's propositional attitude towards the content of 
an information. In this sense, information and knowledge are interdependent, and both can thus be 
intelligence. 
The main concept of intelligence is the threat. This is reflected in the seminar work of J. 
David Singer in 1958, Threat Perception and the Armament-Tension Dilemma, (Singer 1958) 
through a quasi-mathematical model: 
Threat-Perception = Estimated Capability x Estimated Intent 
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Intent and capability parameters can be described as the dominant episteme used to 
understand the threat in the field of intelligence analysis. (Vandepeer 2011) Since only the threat 
actor is important from the ontological point of view, it means that for Singer only the intentions 
and abilities of the threat actor matter. 
Samuel Huntington, in The Soldier and the State (1957), claims that military personnel are 
qualified to assess their capabilities, but not their intentions. (Huntington 1981) Despite the 
changes that include non-state actors' assessments as a priority, the threat remains defined using 
only one model, focusing specifically on the threat actor. This assumes that analysts already know 
and understand the threat actor they are trying to assess. Threat evaluation is based on the 
knowledge and understanding of an actor. Identification is presumed. 
The Singer model was later extended by adding new parameters, of which the most 
common are vulnerability and opportunity. The vulnerability parameter focuses rather on the threat 
reference, resulting in vulnerability being defined as the susceptibility of a reviewer to an attack. 
Richard Pilch uses the following formula: (Howard and Sawyer 2003) 
Threat = Vulnerability x Capability x Intent 
One of the issues of the vulnerability parameter is that the more generic the target (referent) 
potential, the less correct will be the threat assessment. 
The opportunity parameter also appears as a complement to the conventional model: 
Threat = Intent x Capability x Opportunity 
Opportunity incorporates an understanding of both the threat actor and the referent and can 
be defined as a favorable time or opportunity for a threat actor in relation to a reviewer. (Vandepeer 
2011) 
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Despite efforts to incorporate additional parameters, the primary assumption is that the 
dominant episteme, with a primary focus on the threat actor, remains essential to assessing the 
threat. 
Investigation theory addresses different ways in which each type of investigation achieves 
its purpose. Bennets (Holsapple 2004) distinguishes between data, information and knowledge, 
stating that: 
"data is discrete, objective facts about events which include numbers, letters and images without 
context, while information is data with some level of meaning as it describes a situation or 
condition. Knowledge is built on data and information, and is created within the individual. 
This knowledge represents understanding of the context, insights into the relationships 
within a system and the ability to identify leverage points and weaknesses and to 
understand the future implications of actions taken to resolve problems." 
In order to produce objective intelligence, the analyst must use a process tailored to the 
nature of the problem, using one of the fundamental ways of reasoning: (Krizan 1999) induction 
(causality search, discovery of the relationships between the studied phenomena), deduction 
(general application, from general to specific), trained intuition (applying a spontaneous 
perspective, validated with available facts and tools), scientific method (hypothesis falsification 
and fictitious scenario testing). 
Induction: When analysts make a generalization or discover relationships between 
phenomena based on observations or other evidence. 
"Induction consists in establishing syllogistically a relation between one extreme and the middle 
by means of the other extreme, e.g. if B is the middle term between A and C, it consists in 
proving through C that A belongs to B. For this is the manner in which we make 
inductions." (Aristotle 1989, chap. 2.23) 
Stephen Marrin expands the inductive approach, indicating that analysts have an analytical 
approach in two stages. (Marrin 2012a) They use intuitive "pattern and trend analysis" - identifying 
repetitive behavior over time, then relying on ad hoc rules or mental models derived from the study 
of relevant theory - for example, economics, political science or psychology - to determine the 
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meaning of the model. (Duvenage 2010) Michael Collier argues that the inductive method leaves 
too much room for conjecture, superstition and opinion. 
Deduction: Judgment starting from general rules to specific cases, if the hypothesis is 
tested, contrary to the inductive reasoning where the hypothesis is created. 
”Whenever three terms are so related to one another that the last is contained in the middle as in a 
whole, and the middle is either contained in, or excluded from, the first as in or from a 
whole, the extremes must be related by a perfect syllogism. I call that term middle which 
is itself contained in another and contains another in itself: in position also this comes in 
the middle. By extremes I mean both that term which is itself contained in another and that 
in which another is contained. If A is predicated of all B, and B of all C, A must be 
predicated of all C: we have already explained what we mean by 'predicated of all'. 
Similarly also, if A is predicated of no B, and B of all C, it is necessary that no C will be 
A.” (Aristotle 1989, chap. 1.4) 
Krizan quotes Clauser and Weir (Krizan 1999) who warn that deductive reasoning should 
be used with care in the intelligence analysis, as there are rarely closed systems, thus premises 
based on another set of facts, applied to a new problem and supposed to be true may be false and 
lead to incorrect conclusions. 
Unlike deductive arguments, in inductive reasoning there is the possibility that the 
conclusion is false, even if all the premises are true. Instead of being valid or invalid, inductive 
arguments are strong or weak, which shows how likely it is that the conclusion is true. 
Abduction: The unofficial or pragmatic way of reasoning to describe how we "justify the 
best explanation" in everyday life. 
”We have Reduction (1) when it is obvious that the first term applies to the middle, but that the 
middle applies to the last term is not obvious, yet nevertheless is more probable [credible] 
or not less probable [credible] than the conclusion; or (2) if there are not many intermediate 
terms between the last and the middle; for in all such cases the effect is to bring us nearer 
to knowledge." (Aristotle 1989, chap. 2.25) 
Waltz asserts that abduction is, in intelligence, a practical description of an interactive 
analysis and synthesis set to arrive at a solution or explanation, creating and evaluating more 
hypotheses. (Waltz 2003, 173) In abduction, the analyst creatively generates a set of hypotheses 
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and sets out to examine whether the available evidence is unequivocally supported by each other. 
The final step, namely testing the evidence, is a deductive inference. Abduction can be likened to 
the intuition of the analyst. This reasoning is erroneous because it is subject to cognitive errors but 
has the ability to extend the understanding of the intelligence matter beyond the original premises. 
Scientific method: It uses induction to develop the hypothesis, and deduction is used to be 
tested. If testing does not validate the hypothesis, a new hypothesis should be formulated, and new 
experiments designed to validate this hypothesis. (Marrin 2012a) In the analysis of information 
there are no direct experiments and observations of the subject, but the analyst can develop 
hypotheses or explanations from information obtained from different sources. Hypotheses can then 
be examined for plausibility and iteratively tested against new information. (Duvenage 2010) 
Structural analysis: It represents additional tools for traditional and intuitive analysis 
methods and are not just alternatives. Using structural analysis methods could not only improve 
the quality of intelligence analysis but also enhance the credibility of the analysis that is often 
prone to criticism of actual or perceived politicization and other organizational pressures. Heuer 
and Pherson (Heuer and Pherson 2010) classifies 50 structural analytical methods in eight 
categories that correlate with common cognitive traps and indicates the functions that analysts 
have to meet to overcome these traps. Some of these methods are: 
• Decomposition and view: to exceed the limits of the working memory 
• Idea generation techniques: stimulating the analyst's mind with new possibilities to 
investigate and visualize an intelligence problem from different angles 
• Scenarios, indicators, bookmarks: identifying those who could change a situation and 
outlining the various possible scenarios 
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• Generating and testing hypotheses: analysts, in the subconscious, hypothesize each 
information and validate them intuitively; structured analytical tools help to examine a 
wider range of alternative hypotheses, possibilities and explanations 
• Analysis of causes and effects: analysts should be cautious in unsafe assumptions and 
conclusions regarding the cause and effect of certain events or indicators 
• Reframing techniques: helps analysts to change their reference/mentality frameworks to an 
analytical problem by changing questions or perspectives 
• Challenge analysis techniques: helps deliver the best possible product to customers where 
there are major differences in views, highlighting minority views 
• Analysis of decision support: allows analysts to see the issue from the perspective of 
decision-makers. 
Biases: Biases can distort the correct application of inductive argumentation, thus 
preventing the formation of the most logical conclusion based on clues. Examples of such 
prejudices include availability heuristics, confirmation biases, and prediction biases. 
4.1. The tacit knowledge (Polanyi) 
Owen Ormerod has developed a theory that Michael Polanyi's opinion on science can 
contribute to understanding the process and the "product" of intelligence analysis. (Ormerod 2018) 
Michael Polanyi's arguments about the activities of scientists are transferable in the field of 
intelligence analysis, providing a nuanced perspective for perceiving the epistemological 
challenges and the problems faced by analysts. Polanyi's concepts of "tacit knowledge" and 
"personal knowledge" contribute to the development of a more efficient epistemological 
understanding of some aspects of the process and the intelligence analysis product. 
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There is a multitude of attempts, both in the national security literature and in the law 
enforcement literature, to align the analysis of intelligence to "scientific" principles and practices. 
(Cooper and Intelligence 2012) Ormerod argues that the theory developed by Polanyi is 
transferable in the field of intelligence. Polanyi's concepts of tacit and personal knowledge have a 
strong influence on the perception of the intelligence practice. 
At present there is a growing interest in looking for a "theory of intelligence." (Hunter and 
MacDonald 2017) In this context, epistemological issues will be at the forefront of intelligence 
analysis. (Lillbacka 2013, 304) Intelligence analysis is a knowledge-building activity, and 
improved analysis requires an understanding of epistemology or the theory of origin and the nature 
of relevant knowledge. A discursive mode of perception of the field of intelligence can be 
distinguished in two fundamental ways: (Bang 2017) a) how to obtain information; b) how 
intelligence can help policy-makers, based on the information gathered and analyzed. (Mudd and 
Abbey 2015) 
The epistemological bases of intelligence studies are largely extracted from the "national 
security" paradigm. (O’Malley 2016) Patrick Walsh has presented three fundamental 
characteristics that clearly represent the foundation of the intelligence profession: the "intelligence 
medium" (collection and analysis), "secrecy" (undercover and collection) and "supervision" 
(monitoring of the subjects in question). (Walsh 2010, 29) 
The objectives of the intelligence analyst can generally include the following categories: 
1. The prescriptive modeling required by analysts to represent how systems might work; 2. 
Descriptive modeling used to understand a given situation and how it works; 3. Predictive or 
exploratory modeling of how a dynamic system could work in the future under certain 
circumstances. (Waltz 2014, 2–3) 
Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of Intelligence Agencies 
43 
There is a strong interest in psychologically looking at the aspects of the analysis. (Heuer 
1999) This is particularly true of understanding knowledge in the analysis. (Waltz 2014, 1) 
Analysts must be sensitive not only to the conclusions they reach, but also to the way they have 
come to such assertions. As Heuer observed: 
"Intelligence analysts should be self-conscious about their reasoning processes. They should think 
about how they make judgments and reach conclusions, not just about the judgments and 
conclusions themselves." (Heuer 1999, 31) 
In this psychological sense, intelligence analysis is an activity that engages in meta-
knowledge or, as Mark Lowenthal notes, "thought thinking". (Moore and College 2010, 8) A 
central purpose of intelligence analysis is a transition from "knowledge" to "understanding." (Ellis-
Smith 2016, 36) 
According to Ormerod, Polanyi's concept of "personal knowledge" contributes to a more 
nuanced epistemological framework for explaining what analysts mean to "know" the intelligence 
products. (Ormerod 2018) For Polanyi, truth is an objective condition, and finding truth is 
accomplished through the correspondence of a theory with an objective reality. (Jacobs 2001, 464) 
Polanyi rejects cognitive relativism or relativity of reality based on our perception. (Polanyi 1962, 
315–16) Polanyi was convinced that there was an objective reality; however, to become 
intelligible, we must try to "establish and make our own" interpretation and understanding. 
(Polanyi and Sen 2009, 80) According to Polanyi, the discovery process begins at the moment 
when certain impressions are considered unusual and suggestive, a problem is presented to the 
mind; continue with collecting clues with one eye at a particular problem-solving line; and 
culminates in the assumption of a clear solution. (Polanyi 1964, 25) 
Polanyi provides a challenging approach to understanding these epistemological issues in 
the intelligence analysis. For Polanyi, there is the hypothesis behind the observation act. (Polanyi 
1998, 19) According to Polanyi, scientific investigations involve a perennial interaction of 
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imagination and observation. While the field of information activity recognizes that it is partially 
involved in a guessing game, the art of investigation, as Polanyi understands, offers a richer 
language (Colapietro 2011, 58) and the epistemological basis for recognizing this aspect in 
scientific and intelligence analysis. 
Polanyi argues that, in order to take account of the problem-solving and discovery process, 
we need to recognize sufficiently the important role of tacit knowledge and the relationship that 
this knowledge has with tacit knowledge. Polanyi locates this form of knowledge as an essential 
element of his science and epistemology. 
"Polanyi’s concept of personal knowledge articulates epistemologically that within the field of 
intelligence the work of the analyst is too diversified for there to be a single overarching 
‘top down’ approach to understanding knowledge claims as a product ((Bang 2017), ...). 
According to Polanyi, since there is no ‘scientific method’, the scientist must draw on their 
personal knowledge, which importantly posits that knowledge claims must sufficiently 
acknowledge the role of the ‘knower’. This is the central argument underpinning the idea 
of a bottom-up understanding of what it means to ‘know’ something. Knowledge claims 
are affirmed by the ‘personal coefficient’ of the analyst’s personal knowledge, which 
according to Polanyi, is a fundamental feature of what it means to ‘know’ something. 
(Polanyi 1962, 267) Polanyi’s arguments in relation to the authority of science as a valid 
form of inquiry and way of understanding knowledge claims as an enterprise further 
highlights the bottom-up way of perceiving knowledge as a product. According to Polanyi, 
the ‘authority of scientific opinion’ is ‘essentially mutual’, being ‘established between 
scientists, not above them’. (Polanyi 1969, 56) The authority of knowledge claims can 
therefore be characterized as being bottom-up, according to Polanyi’s view. This 
perspective has a bearing on the intelligence analysis discipline by offering an alternative 
way of considering a broad range of epistemological issues, principally in relation to what 
it means to ‘know’ something." (Ormerod 2018) 
5. Methodologies 
Methodology, in intelligence, consists of the methods used to make decisions about threats, 
especially in the intelligence analysis discipline. 
The enormous amount of information collected by intelligence agencies often puts them in 
the inability to analyze them all. According to McConnell, the US intelligence community collects 
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over one billion daily information. (McConnell 2007) The nature and characteristics of the 
information gathered as well as their credibility also have an impact on the intelligence analysis. 
The capability parameter is essential to the current understanding of the threat. (Vandepeer 
2011) Analysts use two approaches to capacity assessment: the use of measures and proxy 
measures. A measure allows a direct assessment of the capacity. Proxy measures are indirect 
measures used to make deductions in terms of capacity. 
For the assessment of a country's military weapons and armed forces, in addition to 
capacity measures, there are five direct measures to assess military capability: leadership and C2 
(command and control); order-of-battle; force readiness and mission; force sustainability; and 
technical sophistication, (Joint Publication 2-01 2012) plus proxy measures (military related 
subjects assessment), including C4 systems (telecommunications and networks); the state’s 
Defence industries; energy/power; geography; demography; and medical capability. State 
capabilities may only be known once they are effectively used against an opponent. (Vandepeer 
2011) 
The nature itself of an intention means that it is not "measurable" like capacity. It is 
estimated or deduced from observable factors, called indicators (observable factors used to deduce 
or observe current or future intentions). The indicators provide a means of inferring rather than 
quantifying. 
There are three indicators that appear significantly in assessing state intentions: the military 
capacity of the state; ideology of the state; and words, actions and behaviors of state leaders. So, 
military capacity assessments are not enough to infer a state's intentions. The ideology of a state 
reflects political leadership, the third indicator of intentions. 
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Intelligence analysts are "essentially information translators, whose role is to review 
information and provide reliable intelligence in a practical and operational format." (Cope 2004, 
188) The U.K. National Intelligence Model describes four major products resulted in the analysis 
process: strategic assessments, tactical assessments, target profiles and problem profiles,. 
(Association of Chief Police Officers, Bedford 2005) The evaluation of information implies their 
credibility, together with an assessment of the reliability of the sources. (Palmer 1991, 22) There 
are few formal information rating systems used by analysts around the world. The most common 
of these methods is the Admiralty System (referred to as the NATO System), which is used to 
demonstrate the net value of certain information based on the reliability of the source and the 
validity of the data. (Besombes, Nimier, and Cholvy 2009) The traditional model is a 6 x 6 matrix. 
Agencies operating within the National Intelligence Model in the UK use an alternative 
classification system commonly called the 5x5x5 system. (Joseph and Corkill 2011) 
The prism theory of Robert Flood, termed by others as methodological pluralism, uses the 
metaphor to describe creative thinking and transformation, a prism that decomposes light into its 
component colors through double refraction. This type of thinking produces multiple different 
visions on the same thing and a common vision for many different things. Its purpose is to 
challenge hypotheses, provoke new ideas and generate unexpected prospects. (Flood 1999) 
(Duvenage 2010, 81) 
The concept of prismatic thinking has gained ground in the analysis of information. Jones 
states that besides convergent thinking, we also need divergent thinking to ensure an effective 
analysis and problem solving. (M. D. Jones 2009) Divergence helps analysts analyze a more 
creative issue, while convergence helps to achieve completion. (Duvenage 2010, 82) 
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Wolfberg proposes a full-spectrum mindset, in which the analyst applies both intuitive and 
structural methods, depending on the specific context, assuming at the outset that there are multiple 
interrelated problems that need to be solved simultaneously. (Wolfberg 2006) (Duvenage 2010, 
83) 
Waltz conceived the integrated reasoning process, (Waltz 2003) an integrated formal and 
informal methods of reasoning for analysis-synthesis in the operational environment of the 
intelligence activity. The process stems from a set of evidence, and a question for them that 
explains the evidence. This process, from a set of evidence to detection, explanation or discovery, 
detects the presence of evidence, explains the processes underlying the evidence, and discovers 
new patterns in the evidence. The model illustrates four basic ways that can use the set of evidence: 
three fundamental ways of reasoning and a fourth way of feedback: deduction (by testing on 
models/hypotheses previously known), retroduction (when the analyst conjectures a new 
conceptual hypothesis causes a return to the set of evidence), abduction (creates explanatory 
hypotheses inspired by the set of evidence), induction (searching for general statements 
(assumptions) about evidence). (Duvenage 2010, 84–85) 
Waltz typifies the analysis-synthesis process as a process of decomposing evidence and 
building the model, helping the analyst to identify the missing information, the strengths and 
weaknesses of the model. The model serves two functions: hypothesis (if the evidence is limited), 
and explanatory (when more evidence matches the hypothesis). The process involves three phases 
defined using the term "space" and the use of structural analytical techniques: data space (data is 
indexed and sorted), argument space (the data are reviewed, correlated and grouped into a set of 
hypotheses) and explanatory phase (models are composed to serve as explanations). (Duvenage 
2010, 86) 
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The flow of cognitive process is identified as: searching and filtering, reading and 
extracting, schematizing, building the case, telling the story, reevaluating, looking for support, 
looking for evidence, looking for relationships, looking for information. (Duvenage 2010, 88) 
A rigorous analytical model that can help analysts was developed by Zelik, Patterson and 
Woods in 2007. This model improves Heuer and Pherson's structured self-critique technique. This 
model has eight rigorous indicators: exploration of the hypothesis, search for information, 
validation of information, stance analysis, sensitivity analysis, collaboration of specialists, 
synthesis of information, explanation critique. This model explains cognitive processes, provides 
the first metric to test informational products, and provides a framework for collaborative learning. 
(Duvenage 2010, 91–92) 
Duvenage details further the sensemaking concept derived from cognitive and especially 
organizational theory, (Weick 1995) is used in knowledge to investigate and describe how the 
individual, the group and, specifically, the organization are confronted with uncertainties and adapt 
to complexity. (Duvenage 2010, 92–93) At the individual level, sensemaking means the ability to 
perceive, analyze, represent, visualize and understand the environment and the situation in an 
appropriate contextual manner. (Cooper and Intelligence 2012) This is known in intelligence 
analysis as situational awareness or environmental scanning. The relevance of meaning in 
information analysis becomes clear when seven properties of Weick's significance are applied to 
the psychology of Heuer's information analysis: social context, grounded in identity construction, 
retrospective, driven by plausibility rather than accuracy, ongoing, extracting from salient cues, 
enacting. (Duvenage 2010, 94–95) 
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Fishbein and Treverton cite Klein, Stewart, and Claxton, who argue that empirical research 
has shown that intuitive judgment is the basis of most organizational decisions and is superior to 
analyzing problems marked by ambiguity or uncertainty. (Shulsky and Schmitt 2002) 
Robert M. Clark proposed a methodology for analyzing information by addressing the 
target-centric intelligence cycle (Clark 2003) as an alternative to the traditional information cycle. 
It has redefined the informational process in the form of an integrated network where information 
can circulate directly between the different stages of the cycle (practically, nor is it a cycle in the 
traditional sense of the term). 
Sherman Kent encouraged arguments and dissent among intelligence analysts to reach a 
"wide range of outside opinions", (Davis 1995) encouraging "collective responsibility for 
judgment" by networking the intelligence with loops of feedback between analysts and various 
stages of the intelligence cycle. 
Conceptual models allow analysts to use powerful descriptive tools to estimate current 
situations and predict future circumstances. (Clark 2003, 37) After the model was sketched, the 
analyst populated the model by researching, gathering information and synthesizing. He has to 
find information from a wide range of classified and unclassified sources, depending on the targets. 
The collected data must be collated, organized, and the evidence is evaluated for relevance 
and credibility. After analyzing the data, the analyst includes the information in the target model, 
thus determining where inconsistencies exist in the conclusions by further research to support or 
deny a certain conclusion. The target model shows where there are gaps in the model. Possible 
discrepancies force the analyst to collect additional information to better describe the goal. 
Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of Intelligence Agencies 
50 
Robert M. Clark's organizational model helps analysts successfully describe the target 
organization and see the strengths and weaknesses of the target for predictive and reliable analysis. 
(Clark 2003, 227) 
General Stanley A. McChrystal proposed in 2014 a targeting cycle called "F3EA" used in 
the war in Iraq, which means: 
1. Find: A target (person or location) is first identified and located. 
2. Fix: The target is then kept under continuous surveillance while a Positive Identification is 
established. 
3. Finish: A raiding force is assigned to capture or kill the target. 
4. Exploit: Intelligence material is secured and mined, with detainees interrogated. 
5. Analyze: Information is studied to identify further targeting opportunities. (McChrystal 
2014) 
Richards Heuer states that no method guarantees the success of the conclusions. Analysts 
need to continually improve it, depending on their specific context and previous personal 
experiences. (Heuer 1999) Also, in the case of a network cycle approach, it should be borne in 
mind that these models consume much longer than a traditional cycle. (Johnston 2005) 
Structural analytical techniques are used to provoke judgment, identify mentalities, 
overcome prejudices, stimulate creativity, and manage uncertainty. Examples include verifying 
the main assumptions, competing hypothesis analysis, the devil's advocate, red team analysis, and 
alternative futures / scenarios analysis, among others. (US Government 2009) The following 
methods are ways to validate the analyst's judgment: 
Opportunity analysis: Identifies, for decision-makers, opportunities or vulnerabilities that 
their organization can exploit. 
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Linchpin analysis: results from information that is certain or likely to be safe. (Davis 1999) 
Analysis of competing hypotheses:  The analysis of competing hypotheses was a step 
forward in the methodology of information analysis. More challenges, according to Heuer, are 
more important than more information, especially to avoid rejecting cheating at hand, as the 
situation seems to be simple. The steps in the analysis of competing hypotheses are: (Heuer 1999) 
1. Identify the possible assumptions to be considered. Use a group of analysts with different 
perspectives to understand the possibilities. 
2. Make a list of significant evidence and arguments for and against each hypothesis. 
3. Prepare a matrix with assumptions at the top and evidence at the bottom. Analyze the 
"diagnosis" of evidence and arguments - that is, identify the elements that are most useful 
in assessing the relative probability of hypotheses. 
4. Refine the matrix. Review hypotheses and delete proofs and arguments that do not have 
diagnostic value. 
5. Make tentative conclusions about the relative probability and inconsistency of each 
hypothesis. Continue trying to reject assumptions rather than prove them. 
6. Analyze how sensitive your conclusion is to some critical evidence. Consider the 
consequences for your analysis if this evidence was wrong, misleading or subject to a 
different interpretation. 
7. Report the conclusions. Discuss the relative probability of all hypotheses, not only the most 
probable. 
8. Identify landmarks for future observation that may indicate that events have a different 
course than expected. 
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Analyzing competing hypotheses is auditable and helps overcome cognitive biases. It 
allows the return to evidence and hypothesis, and therefore the monitoring of the succession of 
rules and data that led to the conclusion. 
• Realistic ACH activities leave analysts disoriented or confused. 
Van Gelder proposed hypothesis mapping as an alternative to competing hypothesis 
analysis. (van Gelder 2012) 
The structural analysis of competing hypotheses provides analysts with an improvement 
over original limits, (Wheaton and Chido 2007) maximizing possible assumptions and allowing 
the analyst to divide a hypothesis into two complex assumptions. 
A method, used by Valtorta and colleagues, uses probabilistic methods, adding Bayesian 
analysis to competing hypotheses. (Goradia, Huang, and Huhns 2005) A generalization of this 
concept led to the development of CACHE (Collaborative ACH Environment), (Shrager et al. 
2010) which introduced the concept of the Bayesian community. The work of Akram and Wang 
applies paradigms in graph theory. (Shaikh Muhammad and Jiaxin 2006) 
Pope's and Jøsang's works use subjective logic, a formal mathematical methodology that 
explicitly deals with uncertainty, (Pope and Jøsang 2005) which forms the basis of Sheba 
technology that is used in intelligence assessment software. 
Analogy: Common in technical analysis, but the engineering features that seem the same 
does not necessarily mean that both have the same mode of operation just because they are similar. 
In the process of intelligence analysis, analysts should follow a series of sequential steps: 
1. Definition of the problem: analysts should try to understand both the mind of the opponent 
and the thinking of their clients and their allies. 
2. Generating hypotheses: based on questions. 
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3. Determining information needs and gathering information: the analyst can request specific 
collection on the topic or, if this is not possible, identify this information gap in the final 
product 
4. Evaluation of sources: The analyst must evaluate the information for reliability, credibility 
and possible false or deception. 
5. Assessment of assumptions (tests): Testing by methods such as competing hypothesis 
analysis or linking diagrams, paying attention to cognitive and cultural prejudices inside 
and outside the organization. 
6. Production and packaging: Very well-structured written and oral presentations, including 
electrical messages, printed reports, briefing, or video; three features are essential to the 
information product: timeliness, scope, and periodicity. 
7. Peer review: Essential for assessing and confirming accuracy. 
8. Feedback and product evaluation: after delivery, the process continues with the interaction 
between the producer and the customer, through mutual feedback, on the basis of which 
both analyses and requirements are refined. 
Effective intelligence analysis must ultimately be tailored for the end user but without 
lowering the quality and accuracy of the product. (M. L. Jones and Silberzahn 2013) 
6. Analogies with other disciplines 
6.1. Science 
Intelligence analysis has many important epistemological resemblances with science 
(problem solving, discovery, skillful use of tools, knowledge verification) and is more interested 
in a posteriori than a priori knowledge, (Agrell and Treverton 2015) on how or the basis on which 
a proposition may be known. (Greco and Sosa 1999, 243–70) Both intelligence analysis and 
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science focus on knowledge gained from empirical observations, knowledge that is typically a 
posteriori. (Ormerod 2018) Regarding the intelligence analysis, epistemological considerations 
are sometimes implicitly considered in the management of prejudices and uncertainties within 
complex intelligence systems. (M. D. Smith 2017) 
Stephen Marrin and Jonathan D. Clemente note that intelligence is "subject to some amount 
of both random and systematic error resulting from built-in limitations of the collection 
instruments themselves, and as a result the information that feeds into the subsequent analysis is 
never an exact representation of reality." (Marrin 2012a) In order to compare the methods used in 
intelligence with the scientific methods, three epistemic pivotal criteria can be used: sample size, 
observation point and data integrity. (Pritchard and Goodman 2009) 
Scientific methods involve collecting huge amounts of information to achieve meaningful 
results. Small sets of data are usually rejected due to statistical uncertainty. In intelligence, the size 
of the relevant samples is extremely small, often only a few separate sources. Gigantic data 
volumes are collected, but selecting relevant information is a difficult process. 
In science, researchers usually keep the original data, which is examined directly, thus 
ensuring a high degree of reliability and certainty. In intelligence, data and information rarely come 
to analysts at first hand. Even the identity of certain people may be uncertain. 
In science, researchers are mindful of their own prejudices, but in general the data is not 
consciously affected. In the intelligence world, the situation is very different: data and information 
are deliberately and on a large scale manipulated with the intent of distorting reality. Sometimes 
even members of the same organization included in the intelligence cycle have reason to distort 
data or even to input false data, often for money or other benefits. 
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After the September 11 attacks in the United States, efforts have been intensified to make 
more "scientific" the methods used in intelligence. (Marrin and Torres 2017) Some of the earliest 
works in the field, including of Sherman Kent, have supported scientific methods not only in 
understanding certain issues but also in making verifiable evaluations. (Agrell 2012, 130) R. A. 
Random wrote in 1958 that the rejection of scientific methodology in favor of intuition would be 
like abandoning rationality in favor of "guessing." (Marrin 2012c, 2) Other researchers in the field 
of intelligence have argued that the scientific method is fundamental for the intelligence analysis. 
(Marrin 2012c, 531) 
The characteristics of such a "scientific method" are data collection, hypothesis formation, 
hypothesis testing, and obtaining conclusions that can be used as reliable predictive sources. (Platt 
1957, 75) 
This analogy is generally considered to be correct insofar as the process is "systematic" 
and "logical": (Ylikoski 2017) "As a science, intelligence analysis is a systematic process, which 
generates and tests hypotheses objectively. Following the scientific method, analysts adhere to 
rules to develop sound and logical judgments." (Martin 2011, 30) 
Both science and intelligence refer to "verifying" as well as "falsifying" the assertions of 
knowledge. (Shrager et al. 2010) Efforts in the field of intelligence to align the analysis with the 
objectives of science, especially with "falsification", have been promoted by several scientists. 
(Shaikh Muhammad and Jiaxin 2006) As Polanyi explains, centralizing understanding of 
knowledge in science is a sufficient recognition of personal knowledge, partly because there are 
no "rules" in the field of science. (Ormerod 2018) For this reason, according to Polanyi, the 
scientist must rely on personal knowledge to make decisions about, for example, whether the 
evidence or clues must be accepted or rejected, just like the intelligence analyst. Polanyi's 
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arguments have an impact both on the field of national security and on law enforcement from 
intelligence analysis, as these areas use empirical observations to develop and understand the 
assertions of knowledge. (Peters and Cohen 2017) In the field of national security, empiricism can 
be observed in the existence of large systems of intelligence gathering. Polanyi contests the 
epistemological basis of excessive faith toward the supposed central role of empiricism and the 
logic of induction in science: "The part played by new observations and experiments in the process 
of discovery in science is usually over-estimated," (Polanyi 1964, 29) a vision opposed to 
conventional understanding of the science promoted by Karl Popper. (Popper 1972, 23–27) 
6.2. Archeology 
The puzzle metaphor is used in both information and archeology. Both disciplines involve 
collecting evidence to build as complete a picture as possible. (Pritchard and Goodman 2009) 
Some tracks are not seen from the beginning, and others are deformed and cannot contribute to the 
logic of assembling. Maybe it would be useful to use the reverse engineering, in order to 
understand how the original image split, what are the stages, and what happened to the missing 
pieces. 
David Clarke highlighted a theory of archeology based on the relationship between the 
ancient known culture and the remains discovered by the excavator, a completed puzzle and the 
missing pieces to be analyzed. 
The necessary steps in any archaeological interpretation are: 
1. The range of patterns of social and environmental activities and processes that once existed, 
that is, what the archeologist is trying to understand (ie, the total activity relevant to 
requesting the intelligence service). 
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2. The sample and remnants that were stored at that time (intelligence analysts are trying to 
find out what elements of their opponent's activity becomes intelligence, what is to be 
collected and from what sources). 
3. Sample of that specimen which has survived and is to be recovered (fragments of 
intelligence held by certain sources, considering their possible distortion). 
4. Sample of the specimen which is recovered. (intelligence gathered through different 
collection systems and sources of primary importance) (Clarke 1968) 
The archaeologist might use the intuition for interpretation, but he can make it very easy. 
The intelligence analyst, in turn, tries to understand the problem using what is available, that is, a 
part of the sample. 
After identifying the accuracy of the intelligence activity for each step, the following 
applicable theory types can be considered: 
Theory of suppositions and depositions: The link between 1 and 2. Determining the 
relationship between the divided total activity and the sample that is potentially accessible to the 
collection systems. Which sources should be used? What are the prejudices? 
Post-depositional theory: The relationship between 2 and 3. To what extent can the passage 
of time distort the sample? 
The theory of restoration: The link between 3 and 4. To what extent the data collected 
represents all that it is possible? How much material has been gathered and what nature? Which 
similar activities could take place elsewhere where access is easy? 
Analytical theory: The link between 4 and 1. The intelligence collector must select the 
relevant information, depending on the analyst's understanding of the intelligence requirements. 
At the same time, constraints (technological or other) may limit the capacity of the collector to 
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transmit certain types of data for further analysis. In this case, certain prioritization decisions can 
be made by giving up some information. 
Theory of interpretation: The analyst provides his/her assessments to decision-makers. 
Here, cognitive biases appear, and methods are used to contract them by questioning hypotheses 
and generating alternative assumptions. 
The archaeological analogy is far from perfect. But it illustrates the steps by which a picture 
is fragmented into fragments for analysis. Analysts should be aware that their data is incomplete, 
but the nature of this incompleteness may not be fully understood, leading to the possibility of 
serious implications. (Pritchard and Goodman 2009) 
6.3. Business 
Intelligence is traditionally characteristic of governmental organizations involved in 
national security issues. But innovative private companies are increasingly adapting the model of 
intelligence services to the business world to help plan their own strategies. The process of 
converting raw information into actionable processed intelligence is almost identical for 
governmental and business organizations, the latter developing the intelligence gathering and 
analysis system with its own methodologies. (Krizan 1999) 
The two activities seem to be two independent areas, but the approach to the challenges is 
quite similar, depending on warning capabilities; (Miscik 2017) decision makers in both cases are 
expected to find out about threats and opportunities in advance. Academic research has 
demonstrated that it is possible to perform a comparative analysis of the two areas (government 
and business) and identify possible parallels between them. (Barnea 2018) In both areas, the 
product of the intelligence activity is the one that supports the decision-making process as a result 
of information about changes in the external environment caused by specific threats. But the 
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ontological, epistemological and methodological study of this process is much better developed 
today in business (Busenitz and Barney 1997) so that national intelligence services can take on 
many of the theories and techniques developed in the field of competitive intelligence. 
A fundamental resemblance between national intelligence and competitive intelligence is 
that both operate based on an "intelligence cycle," (Omand 2011) a multi-stage systematic process 
that ensures the conduct of intelligence under control. 
Competitive intelligence (CI) is a domain whose work consists in defining, collecting, 
analyzing and distributing information on product, customers, competitors, and any environmental 
aspect needed to assist executives and managers in strategic decision-making for an organization. 
It is a legal business practice, unlike industrial espionage, which is illegal. (SCIP 2014) The CI 
focuses on the external business environment, (Haag 2012) being a process involved in collecting 
information, transforming it into processed intelligence and then using it in decision-making. 
(McGonagle and Vella 2003) 
CI is often seen as synonymous with competitors' analysis, but it is more than just analyzing 
competitors; includes the entire environment and stakeholders: customers, competitors, 
distributors, technologies and macroeconomic data. Organizations use CI to compare with other 
organizations ("competitive comparison") to identify the risks and opportunities in their markets 
and to test their plans for market response. ("Business Warfare") (Kurtz 2018) 
Strategic intelligence focuses on long-term issues, analyzing aspects that affect the 
competitiveness of a company over a few years. The real time horizon for strategic intelligence 
ultimately depends on industry and how fast it is changing. This type of intelligence involves, 
among other things, the identification of weak signals and the application of a specific 
methodology and process initially developed by Gilad. (Gilad 2014) 
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In tactical intelligence, the emphasis is on providing information to improve short-term 
decisions, most often related to the intention of increasing market share or revenue. 
The technical advances of massive parallel processing offered by the "big data" architecture 
have allowed the creation of multiple platforms for the recognition of target entities. (Krapohl 
2013) 
CI was influenced by national strategic intelligence. Fleisher suggests that business 
intelligence has two forms. Its more limited (contemporary) shape focuses more on information 
technology and on internal focus than the CI, while the broader (historical) definition is more 
comprehensive than CI. Knowledge management, when specifically designed, is seen as an 
organizational practice based on information technology that uses data mining, corporate intranets, 
and organizational asset mapping to make it accessible to decision-makers. The CI share some 
aspects with knowledge management; contains human and experience-based information for a 
more sophisticated qualitative analysis. Knowledge management is essential for effective change. 
An effective key factor is a powerful IT system dedicated to the execution of the entire intelligence 
cycle. (Barnea 2009) 
Business intelligence (BI) is "a set of methodologies, processes, architectures, and 
technologies that transform raw data into meaningful and useful information used to enable more 
effective strategic, tactical, and operational insights and decision-making." (Evelson 2008) BI 
technologies can handle large amounts of unstructured data to help identify, develop, and create 
new business strategic opportunities. The purpose of BI is to allow easy interpretation of these 
large volumes of data. (Sfetcu 2016) The BI technologies offer historical, current and predictive 
perspectives of business operations. Common functions of BI technologies are reporting, online 
analytical processing, analytical research, data mining, process mining, complex event processing, 
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business performance management, benchmarking, text mining, predictive analysis and 
prescriptive analysis. 
BI can be used to support a wide range of business decisions, from operational to strategic. 
When combined, internal and external data can provide a more complete picture that creates 
"processed intelligence" that cannot be inferred through any single set of data. (Feldman and 
Himmelstein 2013) 
Often, BI scenarios revolve around distinct business processes, each built on one or more 
data sources. These milestones of business intelligence include, but are not limited to: 
• Data sources to collect the necessary data 
• Transform the data into intelligence and present it appropriately 
• Querying and analyzing data 
• Act on collected data. 
A notable similarity between government and business intelligence is the goal of 
maximizing the profits of customer intelligence products. Changes are difficult to monitor due to 
the difficulty in assessing the significance of signals and noise in predictions to reduce uncertainty. 
(Rafii and Kampas 2002) Also, based on the processed information, both proactively act and 
attempt to obtain information that can send alerts about the relevant changes and their meanings. 
(Prescott 2012) In both areas, the intelligence provided to decision-makers can often be a catalyst 
for future action and a new initiative to gain benefits. 
6.4. Medicine 
The medical practice of diagnosing identification, collection, analysis and dissemination is 
similar to that of intelligence. (Converse 2008, 1) Marrin and Clemente argue that both disciplines 
apply similar general approaches to obtain information. (Marrin and Clemente 2005, 709) In order 
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to better understand the data and intelligence gathered, the analyst calls for related disciplines, 
similar to doctors in the diagnosis of patients. 
According to Owen Ormerod, another similarity occurs in the challenges faced both by 
integration of diagnosis or analytical assessments in a wider context, ranging from alternative 
hypotheses to evidence that invalidate, and using deductive and inductive judgments to distinguish 
relevant intelligence from noise. (Marrin and Clemente 2005, 715) 
"Underlying the perceived similarities between intelligence analysis and the medical 
profession is the belief that as more information is collected, the practitioner will become more 
confident in their assessment.” (Treverton 2011, 40) But this is not always true. Under certain 
circumstances of the medical profession, the diagnostic process involves considerations that are 
not "scientific" or structured in a typical way, but are related to doctor bias, craftsmanship and 
what Polanyi would call "personal knowledge." Post-structuralist Michael Foucault presented a 
similar argument that the work of the doctor is influenced by the surrounding culture, as it does 
not "discover" the truth "there" but rather assembles it in the mind, which is partly a product of its 
environment. It is too simplistic to understand the activity of the doctor or intelligence analyst as 
neutral observers who only collect and analyze "the facts." (Ormerod 2018, 28) 
Some intelligence experts have argued that intelligence analysis can benefit from adopting 
models similar to those in the medical field. (Manjikian 2013, 1) Richards Heuer has indicated the 
medical field as a profession that could be imitated by the intelligence. As he states, (Heuer 1999, 
62) the physician observes the symptoms of the patient and, by using his expert knowledge of the 
body, a hypothesis is generated to explain such observations, followed by tests to collect additional 
information to evaluate the hypothesis and apply a diagnosis. This medical analogy emphasizes 
the ability to correctly identify and evaluate all plausible assumptions. In this sense, the collection 
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is focused on information that might reveal alternative assumptions: "While analysis and collection 
are both important, the medical analogy attributes more value to analysis and less to collection 
than the mosaic metaphor." (Heuer 1999, 62) 
7. Conclusions 
There is no universal consensus on how we need to better understand intelligence analysis. 
There are gaps in the literature on the epistemological dimensions of intelligence analysis, both in 
terms of the analysis process and the products or what it means to "know" something. Polanyi's 
views on how scientists engaging in problem solving will contribute to understanding the 
epistemological process and the intelligence analysis product. He stressed that "practical 
knowledge" of scientists about understanding phenomena is an illustration of the instrumental 
function of tacit knowledge. (Ormerod 2018) The relationship between tacit and explicit 
knowledge is the key to understanding the value of treating this concept of Polanyi. He argued that 
there was a strong link between tacit knowledge and personal knowledge, concluding that the logic 
of perception (partly obtained by tacit knowledge) is the same as the logic of discovery and hence 
of the knowledge produced - personal knowledge. Polanyi's nuanced language to cover perceptual 
awareness provides a new context for intelligence to analyze a series of conceptual and practical 
issues in an epistemological sense. These ideas, applied to the epistemological considerations 
faced by the analyst in the analysis process and the use of structural analytical techniques, will 
enrich the language and logic for understanding these issues. Polanyi's personal knowledge theory 
brings new arguments about analyzing intelligence as a product 
According to Owen Ormerod, intelligence analysis can be characterized as an 
epistemological enterprise that seeks to develop a clear understanding of knowledge products. 
Polanyi's perspective on knowledge serves fundamental epistemological considerations on 
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knowledge as a product. The perspective reverses the traditional epistemological hierarchy, which 
usually apprehends the propositional knowledge of more than "tacit" or "personal" ways to 
understand the claims of knowledge. This epistemological position contributes to intelligence 
discipline by giving a more solid image of the personal dimension of knowledge as a product. 
Approaches to what it means to "know" something gives the analysis of intelligence a nuanced 
and detailed epistemological understanding of the personal dimension of knowledge and 
knowledge as a product. 
This is a nuanced way of understanding deeper, from an epistemological point of view, the 
process of problem solving in the intelligence analysis process. Adequate recognition of the 
primacy of tacit knowledge is fundamental to better appreciate the problem-solving process of 
intelligence analysis. This provides a robust epistemological explanation of the problem-solving 
process, which serves to articulate the familiar general aspect of "knowledge" in the intelligence 
activity. Importantly, this framework for understanding the process of a skilled practice involving 
the tacit knowledge of the practitioner underscores the centralization of these epistemological 
issues facing the intelligence analyst and extends the discourse in this area. (Ormerod 2018) 
Since the activity of the intelligence analyst is sometimes "messy and contingent" (Dahl 
2017) rather than "systematic" and "logical", it may be possible to understand the activities of 
analysts as an "artistic enterprise" involving both aspects of "art" as well as science. (Bang 2017) 
Analysts should be aware of their reference frameworks, the intuitive methods they use, 
and the other more structural methods available to add value, especially when individual 
interpretation is insufficient. The various analytical tools and techniques will help analysts and 
decision-makers understand, verbalize, and communicate their thinking processes. Analysts 
should ideally be trained in all different tools and techniques so that they can apply the most 
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appropriate, intuitive/unauthorized or structured tool to a specific problem and stage of the 
intelligence process. (Duvenage 2010) 
The biggest challenge could be to persuade analysts, their management and their clients of 
the advantages of structural analytical methods. A gradual and natural introduction of these 
methods into the usual flow of processes and intelligence products could be more effective than 
real-world thinking on a large scale. Creating training opportunities as well as educating clients to 
request evidence of application of techniques could contribute to this process. 
This would involve a strong commitment from intelligence services, with the potential to 
change the perishable nature of those who have remained tributary to traditional methods. The 
"space" of intelligence has expanded from governments to NGOs, transnational institutions and 
corporations, private firms and interest and pressure groups representing diverse communities, 
concepts and ideologies. Warning on time has become crucial. The decision-making process has 
become dispersed and granular. The current "democratization" of intelligence services has a major 
impact on the collection and analysis of information and decision-making, causing intelligence 
services to become more transparent, to consider public debates about their actions, and sometimes 
to justify publicly. 
Also, the recent terrorist attacks in the United States, Great Britain, Spain, France, etc., 
have demonstrated the need for integrating factors, a collaboration between all intelligence 
organizations to get an overview and to effectively and timely prevent actions against national 
security, redefining not only the new paradigm of the threat but also how organizations respond 
and adapt to these new challenges. 
Law enforcement and intelligence institutions in developing countries rarely have adequate 
information systems, underestimating the value of analysts. Quiggin presents a daunting image, 
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(Quiggin 2007) stating that less than 1% of country's budgets for intelligence are spent for analysis, 
while 99% is spent on technology, secrecy, infrastructure and other items. All specialists agree 
that, in the current geopolitical situation, a synergy between intelligence organizations, intelligence 
analysts and academia is mandatory. The trend in the United States is to provide bachelor, master 
and doctorate programs related to intelligence. 
An area that can benefit from intelligence services is knowledge management, involved in 
a rigorous debate on concepts, theories and approaches to knowledge and its use. Knowledge 
management theorists such as Firestone and McElroy suggest intelligence organizations take into 
account the benefits that this discipline could bring to their activity. (Firestone and McElroy 2003) 
The major changes in the US intelligence analysis framework in recent years, through the 
establishment of alternative analysis methods and facilitating inter-organizational collaboration 
through the latest web technologies, including social networks, have produced over-expectations. 
Unfortunately, very few countries have gone along this path by renouncing the convenience of 
traditional strategies. The new intelligence paradigm requires major organizational changes and 
training of professionals to understand and adopt new concepts and technologies. 
Intelligence services have gradually begun to grasp the need to study other disciplines, 
including business or philosophical (ontological, epistemological, methodological) aspects of their 
own activities, to see how they can improve their skills and deal with new challenges. An excellent 
example is how the FBI reinvented after September 11 following a notable study by three Harvard 
researchers led by Jan Rivkin. (Gulati, Raffaelli, and Rivkin 2016) 
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